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COMMENT
THE COOPERATION CLAUSE IN AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES*
INTRODUCTION
Among the conditions contained in standard automobile policies is
found the assistance and cooperation clause. This condition, broken
down into its essential elements, appears as follows:
The insured
shall
1. cooperate with the company,
2. assist in making settlements, in the conduct of
suits, in enforcing any rights of contribu-
tion or indemnity,
3. attend hearings and trials,
4. assist in securing and giving evidence and ob-
taining the attendance of witnesses.
shall not (except at his own cost, voluntarily)
1. make any payments,
2. assume any obligation,
3. incur any expense,
other than for such immediate medical
(and surgical) relief to others as shall
be imperative at the time of the accident.
The clause is constructed in such a way that both a general duty
as well as certain specific duties are stated. The first seven words set
out the general duty, "the insured shall cooperate with the company,"
and this general duty is not limited by the succeeding list of specific
items.
The list, in the latter part of this clause, of things that the insured
shall do upon the company's request is not all-inclusive; that is,
the more general phrase stating that the insured shall co-operate
with the company is not limited by the succeeding list of specific
items. Canons of construction concerning the resolution of am-
biguities against the company and the limitation of the general
by the particular are not likely to be applied to this duty of co-
operation, since it is a duty that would surely be inferred by the
courts from the relationship between the company and the insured
even if the insurance contract were silent on the matter.1
The obvious purpose of the condition was stated by the Supreme
Court of Illinois as follows: "to enable the insurer to determine whether
there is a defense to a claim growing out of the accident, and if so, to
* The clause is applicable only to Parts I-Liability, and III-Physical Damage,
of the standard automobile liability insurance policy.
1 Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His Liability Insurer, 28 Ins.
Counsel J. 395, 400 (1961).
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properly defend it."2 Additionally, the clause operates to protect the
insurer's interest and to prevent collusion between the insured and an
injured third party claimant.3 To facilitate this purpose, the condition
places a duty on the insured which can be divided into two main areas.
First, the insured must fully and completely disclose the facts and cir-
cumstances of the accident. Secondly, he must participate in the prepara-
tion and trial of the case in the manner requested by the insurer. These
duties are not, however, burdensome or expensive and merely require
good faith on the part of the insured. The insured need only pursue the
same course he would have followed if the insurance contract had not
existed and he had hired an attorney to defend him in his own right at
his own expense. However, this ideal situation may not always exist.
The various attitudes found in some people may make "good faith" mean
different things when insurance is involved. An insured may feel that
the payment of premiums casts the entire burden of post-accident action
on the insurer. His efforts may be limited or changed by thoughts of an
excess judgment, his personal financial position, his interpretation of
fault and also by his relationship to the claimant. These factors along
with others make the clause under consideration a very common matter
for litigation.
In contrast to the insured's duty, the condition also requires the
insurer to exercise good faith and diligence in bringing about coopera-
tion,4 and coverage cannot be denied when the non-cooperation of the
insured is occasioned by the insurer.5 The condition, therefore, contains
reciprocal duties of good faith.
The cooperation clause is a material condition of the liability con-
tract and has universally been held valid.7 The condition is generally
held to be a condition precedent to the insurer's liability8 (the standard
policy specifically makes all terms of the policy conditions precedent)
and the insurer may, at his election, deny coverage if there is a breach.
It should be noted that while the condition is generally held to be
precedent to liability, many courts treat the condition as subsequent,
especially on the question of pleading and proof, by holding that a
breach of the cooperation clause is an affirmative defense and the burden
of proof is upon the insurer.9 The problem and the importance of the
correct legal title given to the condition was stated by the New Hamp-
shire Court:
2 Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kinsolving, 26 Ill. App. 2d 180, 188 (1960).
3 Kindervater v. Motorists Cas. Ins. Co., 120 N.J.L. 373, 199 A. 606 (1938).
4 Imperiali v. Pica, 338 Mass. 494, 156 N.E2d 44 (1959).
5 Tillman v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 207 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1953).6 Storer v. Ocean Acci. & G. Corp., 80 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1935).
7 Watkins v. Watkins, 210 Wis. 606, 245 N.W. 695 (1932).
8 O'Kelley, The Cooperation Clause As a Condition Precedent, 17 Ins. Counsel
J. 27 (1950).
9Id. at 31.
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Whether a condition of the kind here involved shall be called a
condition precedent as in Bachhuber v. Boosalis, 200 Wis. 574,
229 N.W. 117, or a condition subsequent as in Medical, etc., Co.
v. Light, 48 Ohio App. 508, 194 N.E. 446, is perhaps a barren
speculation, but since the effect of the assured's failure to cooper-
ate is to relieve the insurer from an obligation which has already
attached, subject to possible defeasance, it seems more in accord
with the customary use of English terms to call this provision a
condition subsequent. It is, in either event, a "material condition
of the policy" the violation of which by the assured destroys the
right to claim indemnity thereunder.' 0
The duty of cooperation is placed upon the "insured" and this
unqualified use of the word has been held to include the named insured
and any other person using the automobile with the permission of the
named insured." A breach of the condition by an additional insured
may also relieve the insurer of liability."' It may seem logical that
"insured" as used in the condition under consideration would fall under
the same rules of construction that govern the use of the word as it re-
lates to persons insured under the policy in general. Such is not the
case however and the case law makes numerous distinctions. Where the
insured's son, operating the insured's automobile with the permission of
the named insured, failed to cooperate in defending an action against
the insured and the son for injuries arising out of the accident, the
court held that such failure to cooperate did not affect the insured's right
under the policy where the son was not a party to the insured's action
against the company to recover the amount of a judgment previously
entered against the insured. 13 If the additional insured does not realize
he is an additional insured under the policy, any failure to cooperate
while under this belief does not apply to relieve the insurer of liability.'
4
In an Arkansas case, 15 a taxicab driver, hired by the defendant to trans-
port passengers from the company's disabled bus to their destination,
was involved in a collision. The driver gave false information to the
insurer and testified falsely at the trial. This action was not imputed
to the insured to defeat coverage under the policy due to lack of coopera-
tion. The court said:
But the contention for appellant is that the law imputes the mis-
conduct to the transportation company. The requirement of the
policy clause which is relevant here is that the insured (coopera-
tion) shall render the specified cooperation to the insurance
company in that it shall at its cost provide the attendance of its
10 Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Keliher, 88 N.H. 253, 257, 187 A. 473, 475 (1936).
11 Theetge v. Williams, 35 Ill. App. 2d 399, 182 N.E.2d 927 (1962).
12 Potts v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 233 Wis. 313, 289 N.W. 606 (1940).
13 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lopopolo, 97 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1938).
14 Costanzo v. Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 30
N.J. 262, 152 A.2d 589 (1959).
is Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Missouri Pacific Transp. Co., 117 F.2d 313 (8th
Cir. 1941).
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driver involved in an accident at resultant legal proceedings.
There is nothing in the contract, either expressed or reasonably
to be implied, that the insured corporation shall vouch for the
veracity of the driver, or that the driver shall cooperate with the
insurance company. The reference is only to the insured's duty
to provide the attendance of the driver. We find nothing in any
of the cooperation provisions of the policy which can be construed
to mean that the policy liability shall be terminated if the driver
whom the insured was required to produce at the trial turns out
to be an untruthful man.16
Yet another problem is seen when the named insured seeks recovery
from an additional insured. In this situation the clause is inapplicable
as neither is required to cooperate to defeat his own action.17
It can be seen that the use of the word "insured" in the cooperation
clause must be considered in a different light than is the use of the word
in reference to coverage under the policy.
EFFECT OF BREACiH
The general statement that a breach of the condition relieves the
insurer from liability under the policy must be tempered by the case
law. The courts, when finding a breach, have gone further and set up
"degrees of breach" which will or will not make the aforementioned
general statement effective. Further, the various jurisdictions do not
agree on what "degree of breach" operates as a sufficient breach to
relieve the insurer of liability. It is generally held that a lack of coopera-
tion in an unsubstantial or immaterial matter will not act to relieve the
insurer.8 At this point the jurisdictions diverge, some holding that a
"material and substantial" breach is required19 and others requiring
that the insurer prove he was "substantially prejudiced" by the alleged
breach.20 While the doctrine is no longer adhered to, some jurisdictions
had presumed prejudice once a breach had been proven by the insurer. 21
Today, a clear majority of the jurisdictions adhere to the prejudice
standard which places the burden of proof upon the insurer to prove
that the breach was prejudicial to its ability to defend the action.22 The
insurer must have been left "less able to resist a claim against its insured
by defeating recovery or reducing the award of damages.1 23 The burden
the insurer has under this doctrine is a heavy one and a showing that
the insurer would be in a slightly more favorable position had the in-
sured fully cooperated has usually been held insufficient to establish
substantial prejudice.2 4 Where it appears there is no valid defense to
s Id. at 316.7 Margellini v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 33 Cal. App. 2d 93, 91 P.2d 136 (1939).
Is Connell v. Indiana Ins. Co., 334 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1964).
198 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE § 4773 n.21 (Supp. 1967).20Id. at n.22.21 Valladao v. Fireman's Fund, 13 Cal. 2d 322, 89 P.2d 643 (1939).
22 8 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRAcIcE § 4773 n.22 (Supp. 1967).
23 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Koval, 146 F.2d 118, (10th Cir. 1944).24 Leach v. Fisher, 345 Mich. 65, 74 N.W.2d 881 (1956).
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the action, even wilful lack of cooperation has been found unpreju-
dicial. 2- On its surface, this holding appears to work little hardship.
However, the insurer's objectives regarding settlement and defense may
have been substantially changed had it known the whole truth. The
basic reason such a strict standard has been adopted in many jurisdic-
tions appears to be a consideration of public policy protecting the inno-
cent injured third party. The Wisconsin Court in Stippich v. Morrison26
said:
[W]e balanced the intervening rights of such injured third
persons against those of the insurer and concluded that the
insurer should not be relieved from liability to such injured third
person, because of breach of a policy condition by the insured,
unless the insurer has been harmed thereby.27
A minority of courts, and the minority is growing smaller, apply the
"material and substantial breach" standard.2 This doctrine is followed
in jurisdictions where the clause is strictly construed as a condition
precedent 29 or where failure to cooperate is regarded as inherently preju-
dicial.2 0 Again, the burden is upon the insurer to prove noncompliance
of significant proportions. The fact that cooperation would not have
aided the insurer is immaterial under this doctrine.2 ' Justice Cardozo
gave a brief and pointed statement of this doctrine in Coleman v. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co.32 where he said: "Co-operation with the insurer
is one of the conditions of the policy. When the condition was broken,
the policy was at an end, if the insurer so elected." 3 The Illinois Su-
preme Court has specifically rejected the "prejudice" standard and
maintained the "material and substantial" standard. The court said:
"... we reject as obsolete and impracticable the concept that a breach
of the cooperation clause must be asserted and determined on the basis
of an actual showing of prejudice or detriment to the insurer.34
A close reading of the cases from the various jurisdictions, however,
leads one to believe that the practical difference between the two stand-
ards is small, yet of consequence. In a recent case the court classified
the differences as follows:
Under both the material breach and prejudice standards,
courts require the plaintiff in the action on the policy to go for-
ward with specific proof of nonprejudice or immateriality once
a noncompliance of significant proportions is shown by the insu-
25 Rochon v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 118 Conn. 190, 171 A. 429 (1934).
26 12 Wis. 2d 331, 107 N.W.2d 125 (1961).
27 Id. at 337, 107 N.W.2d at 128.
28 Note 19 supra.
29 Bachhuber v. Boosalis, 200 Wis. 574, 229 N.W. 117 (1930).
30 Bauman v. Western & So. Indem. Co., 230 Mo. App. 835, 77 S.W.2d 496 (1934).
31 Schneider v. Autoist Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Ill. 137, 178 N.E. 466 (1931).32 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928).
33 Id. at 277, 160 N.E. at 369.34 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 111. App. 2d 44, 50, 149 N.E.2d 482, 485 (1958).
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rance company. It would seem that the most perceptible difference
between the standards arises in determining the degree of serious-
ness of the noncompliance which will cast the burden of going
forward on the plaintiff, the prejudice standard requiring a higher
quantum than the material breach standard. In borderline cases,
the material breach standard may throw the balance toward the
insurer and the prejudice standard toward the insured or injured
claimant.3 5
The third and final standard which has been used is the "prejudice
presumed" standard. While this standard is no longer used it is worthy
of mention as it illustrates the developing trend in judicial construction
of the cooperation clause.36 Under this standard, the burden is upon
the insured to prove that the breach was not prejudicial to the insurer
once the breach has been presented and proven by the insurer.3 7 This
doctrine had been the established rule in California until 1963 when it
was specifically overruled in Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co.:
Although it may be difficult for an insurer to prove prejudice in
some situations, it ordinarily would be at least as difficult for the
injured person to prove a lack of prejudice, which involves proof
in the negative. The presumption would not be in keeping with
the public policy of this state to provide compensation for those
negligently injured in automobile accidents through no fault of
their own.38
With this ruling, California overruled the previous cases which held
that prejudice would be presumed as a matter of law upon a showing
of a breach of the cooperation clause and the doctrine was eliminated.
This holding and the reasons stated illustrate the direction in which the
courts are heading and the reasons for such a course.
FALSE STATEMENTS
Truthfulness seems to be the keystone of the cooperation arch.
The insured must tell his insurer the complete truth concerning
the accident and must stick to this truthful version throughout
the proceedings. He must not embarrass or cripple his insurer in
its defense against a civil suit arising out of the accident by
switching from one version to another. He must not blow hot
and cold to suit his personal convenience.39
In the above case the insured made five separate statements which
included four varying versions regarding his responsibility for the
death of two pedestrians: (1) insured had not been in any accident;
(2) insured had not been in any accident that he knew of ; (3) the acci-
dent must have happened while he was asleep; (4) insured was guilty
351Barnes v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 146 So.
2d 119 (Fla. App. 1962), cert. denied, 153 So. 2d 305 (1963).36 Valladao v. Fireman's Fund, 13 Cal. 2d 322, 89 P2d 643 (1939).
37Margellini v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 33 Cal. App. 2d 93, 91 P2d 136 (1939).38 32 Cal. Rptr. 827, 829, 384 P.2d 155, 157 (1963).
39Home Indem. Co. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1948).
19681 COMMENT
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
of the crime of hit and run in connection with the accident. The insurer
was relieved of liability.
This case, offers an excellent example of the dilemma in which an
insurer can find itself. What action should it take when it is first told
its insured had no accident, later is faced with a confession and finds all
areas in between also admitted? Should it settle, deny coverage, or de-
fend? Fact situations similar to this illustrate one of the basic reasons
for the clause under consideration. An insurance company is entitled
to an honest statement by the insured of the pertinent circumstances
surrounding an accident subjecting the company to a possible loss as
the insured remembers them. Without that the company is deprived
of the opportunity to negotiate a settlement or to defend upon the solid
ground of facts.4 ° However, a jury finding contrary to the insured's
version is not, as a matter of law, lack of cooperation. In Commercial
Standards Insurance Co. v. Readnourl the insured, in a sworn state-
ment, stated that a passenger was driving at the time of the accident.
The passenger stated, also in a sworn statement, that the insured was
driving. A jury verdict in favor of the passenger finding that the insured
was driving was held insufficient, as a matter of law, to find lack of
cooperation in the degree necessary to relieve the insurer of liability.
As previously stated, any breach of the condition must be material
and substantial. Therefore, the falsehood must relate to a material fact.
However, it need not be conclusive of the issue of liability. In Valladao
v. Fireman's Fund Idem. Co.,42 the insured repeatedly and wilfully
misrepresented to the insurer over a period of several months the actual
identification of the driver of the automobile involved in an accident.
This was held to be a breach sufficient to relieve the insurer even though,
under the omnibus provisions of the policy, coverage was extended to
any person operating the vehicle. Therefore, in fact, the company was
liable regardless of the driver's identity. The court stated:
In other words, the insurer is entitled to a truthful statement of
the circumstances of an accident from its assured even though
under a so-called "omnibus clause" it would equally be liable
for the negligence of another, if such other actually operated the
automobile at the time of the accident and had not been wilfully
misrepresented by the assured as being the operator at such time.43
The company had been misled as to the actual facts of the accident and
this may have affected its judgment as to settlement or procedure for
defense. Under the facts presented, had the company defended its major
witness would have been subject to possible impeachment.
40 Annot., 139 A.L.R. 771, 784 (1942) citing Buffalo v. United States Fidelity &
G. Co., 84F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1936).41241 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1956).
42 Valladao v. Fireman's Fund, 13 Cal. 2d 322, 89 P.2d 643 (1939).
43 13 Cal. 2d 322, 332, 89 P.2d 643, 650 (1959).
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The insured may, after making a false statement, admit the fact
and come forward with the truth. Jurisdictions have dealt with this
problem in various ways.44 New York, interpreting the clause strictly
as a condition precedent, has held that false statements, whether cor-
rected or not, which mislead the insurer are deemed to be prejudicial.
The reasoning used is that the credibility of the insured is destroyed and
this fact would hurt any defense possible. In Fidelity & Casualty Co.
v. Holdeman,45 the insured stated that the plaintiff fell on the insured's
property when she knew that he did not. This statement was promptly
corrected. The court stated:
We find that the discrepancy was material and that it destroyed
the insured's credibility and usefulness as a defense witness in
the personal injury action. We hold that her conduct constituted
a breach of the cooperation clause and, hence, the plaintiff-
insurer is entitled to judgment.4 ,
Even under this strict construction of the clause, bad faith or a wilfull
falsehood must be present in fact or inferentially.47 In a recent case
Judge Hand held that a corrected falsehood, while initially a breach,
could be tolerated if the insured showed that the falsehood had no effect
upon the verdict. He stated:
It seems to us that any deliberate falsification as to an issue
involved in the case even collaterally, is a failure of the coopera-
tion promised by the insured, but it is not necessary to hold that
every such failure will inevitably defeat the insured's claim. In the
case at bar, we know that the jury incorrectly decided the particu-
lar issue as to who was driving the car, but we do not know how
far the change in the insured's stories as to the driver discredited
their testimony exonerating them from liability. Having failed to
cooperate it lay upon them to show that their failure had no
effect upon the verdict.
4
"
Michigan has held that repudiation of a statement favorable to the
defense two weeks prior to trial did not constitute a breach. 49 The court
stated that no prejudice or loss was shown to the company by the con-
duct of the insured and the company had two weeks in which it could
investigate, settle or otherwise adjust to the turn of events. The court
noted that no continuance had been requested. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court recently restated and reviewed the necessity of prejudice to the
insurer resulting from false statements. In Schauf v. Badger State Mu-
tual Casualty Co.50 the insured, Thur, stated he was driving the automo-
bile of a friend at the time of an accident. The friend's automobile
44 Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 264 (1954).
4523 App. Div. 2d 878, 259 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1965).
46Id. at 879, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
47 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Coe, 21 App. Div. 2d 34, 248 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1964).4 8 Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bascom, 287 F.2d 73, 75 (2nd Cir. 1961).
49Bernadich v. Bernadich, 287 Mich. 137,283 N.W. 5 (1938).5036 Wis. 2d 480, 153 N.W.2d 510 (1967).
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being uninsured, the company entered into the defense of the action
under coverage granted in its policy to a non-owned automobile. The
policy limit was $10,000 and since the complaint demanded damages in
excess of this amount, an "excess letter" was sent. Evidently realizing
that some personal liability could result, the insured admitted he was
not the driver of the car. The court, in holding for the insurer and dis-
missing the complaint, stated:
In Kurz v. Collins, 6 Wis. 2d 538, 95 N.W.2d 365 (1959),
dealing with a motion for summary judgment in which a non-
cooperation defense was urged, we held that when third parties'
rights had intervened, a breach of the cooperation clause was not
a defense unless the insurer was harmed or prejudiced thereby.
Normally, this harm cannot be determined until the trial of the
issue on liability in respect to negligence because the materiality
of the alleged breach is determined in reference to the issue of
liability of the insurer on its policy. If the insured is not found
liable because he was not negligent, the insurer is not liable on
his policy and the lack of cooperation was not in fact prejudicial
or harmful and therefore not material. However, harm may be
apparent prior to the determination of the issue of negligence.
The court pointed out that false statements relating to the identity
of the driver of a car could be material as a matter of law because
of the present certainty of the prejudicial or disastrous effect on
the fact finding process. . . Thus, many cases involving the
defense of lack of cooperation are such that the issue cannot be
determined until after the determination of the negligence-
liability question and while the third party may prevail on this
issue, harm may have been proved on the breach of cooperation
issue and thus the insurer would prevail on its policy defense.51
However, in State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Walker,52 a
case arising under the Indiana guest statute and presenting facts similar
to those in Schauf, the federal court held that prejudice could not be
determined prior to the final decision in the action where there were
controverted facts at issue. Summary judgment had been granted to the
insurer and the federal court reversed on appeal.
The interpretation presented by the Michigan and Wisconsin courts
appears to be in the majority, and a showing of a substantial contradic-
tion in material breach jurisdictions or substantial prejudice in jurisdic-
tions which require this type of breach, coupled with bad faith, appears
necessary.53 The burden remains upon the insurer.
FAILURE TO APPEAR AT TRIAL
Generally speaking, the insurance contract is based on a con-
cept of indemnity and the legal liability of the insurance carrier
is derived from its payment of damages for which its insured will
51 Id. at 485, 153 N.W.2d at 512.
52382 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1967).
53 16 DEFENSE L.S. 230 (1967).
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become legally liable. Consequently, it is within the contemplation
of the parties that the insured will be present and will assist and
aid in the defense of the charges made against him in order to
prevent or at least lessen the damages which will comprise the
basis of indemnity. The contemplated availability of the insured is
a material factor and his disappearance, his failure to be present
for depositions or trial, would be substantial and consequential
matters and lack of cooperation as to these would be sufficient
to void the policy.54
The above statement must again be limited by the law in the various
jurisdictions which require the insurer to show prejudice or substanti-
ality of the breach.5 5 This burden is on the insurer and he must also
affirmatively show good faith and reasonable diligence to secure atten-
dance. New York, however, requires only the showing of non-
appearance as a breach of the condition and, if shown, presumptive
prejudice results.56 In another case, coverage was denied when the
named insured failed to attend the trial concerning an accident he had
not even witnessed.57 Generally, the cases held that the testimony of the
absent insured must be material to the defense of the action and such
absence must be wilful. Mere absence alone is not sufficient.58 Leaving
the state after testifying by deposition has been held not to be a
failure of cooperation. 59 In the same light, the failure of an insured to
appear was held not prejudicial where the possible testimony would
only have tended to establish the insurer's liability.60 However, in Glens
Falls Indem. Co. v. Keliher,61 it was held that the fact that the insured's
testimony was likely to establish liability did not support the insured's
allegation that his absence did not harm the insurer and that his failure
to be present therefore was not material. The court said:
There are both practical and theoretical answers to this argument.
Every person familiar with the trial of cases by jury knows that
the case of an individual defendant is seriously, if not hopelessly,
prejudiced by his absence from the trial. Such absence, if not
adequately explained, is a circumstance "chiefly persuasive in its
effect," . . which normally affects the decision of the jury upon
all questions submitted to them. Even if the liability of the de-
fendant were admitted or conclusively established, it cannot be
doubted that the mental attitude of the jury in assessing damages
54 Bower, Notice and Breach of Cooperation Requirements, Practicing Law In-
stitute Liability Insurance Litigation (New York 1966).
55 Terbell, Cooperation of the Insured in Automobile Liability Cases-Attend-
ance at Trial, 16 DEFENSE L.J. 139 (1967).
56 Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty, 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928).
57 Bauman v. Western & Southern Indem. Co. 230 Mo. App. 835, 77 S.W2d 496
(1935).
58 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 237 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1956);
Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gean, 208 Tenn. 410, 346 S.E.2d 262 (1961).
59 Durbin v. Lord, 329 Ill. App. 333, 68 N.E.2d 537 (1946).
60 Panhans v. Associated Indem. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 2d 532, 47 P.2d 791 (1935).
61 88 N.H. 253, 187 A. 473 (1936).
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would'be influenced by his unexplained absence from the court-
room.
62
Procedurally, the insurer has been held to be under no obligation to
move for a continuance 63 and any excuse offered by the insured for his
absence must be one which would receive favorable'consideration on a
motion for new trial.
64
Correlative to the insured's duty to assist the insurer through his
attendance at trial is the duty of the insurer to reimburse the insured
for all reasonable expenses connected with such attendance. The supple-
mentary payment clause of most policies reads: "To pay, in addition
to the applicable limits of liability: ... all reasonable expenses, other
than loss of earnings, incurred by the insured at the company's request."
In American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Vliet65 the insured rendered every
possible assistance to the insurer in the action against the insured. A
judgment was rendered against the insured after which the insured
moved some 750 miles away. A garnishment action was instituted against
the insurer. Upon the insurer's request for the insured to return for the
trial the insured offered to return only if the insurer would pay her
expenses. The court held for the insured and stated that the insured
must attend the trial without reimbursement for loss of time or wages 66
but is not required to attend at his own expense for out-of-pocket costs.
The requirement that the insured attend trial without any reimbursement
for loss of wages may be unreasonable and the argument might prevail
that it woujd be unreasonable to require attendance if the possible loss
would be disproportionately high. The first revision of the special
package automobile form (January 1, 1963) provides that the insurer
will pay "reasonable expenses incurred by the insured at the company's
request, including actual loss of wages or salary (but not loss of other
income) not to exceed $25 per day because of his attendance at hearings
or trials at such request." While the provision provides for a maximum
of $25 per day the argument might still prevail that it would be unrea-
sonable to demand attendance if the loss would be much greater than
the stated amount.
REFUSAL TO SIGN PLEADINGS
in order to make a complete, fair and legitimate defense in an
action it is necessary for the insurer to have signed pleadings. This
problem usually presents itself when the insured refuses to verify the
answer.
62 Id. at 258, 187 A. at 476.
63 Goldstein v. Bernstein, 315 Mass. 329, 52 N.E.2d 559 (1944).
64Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Partridge, 183 Tenn. 701, 192 S.W.2d 701
(1946).65 148 Fla. 568, 4 So. 2d 862 (1941).
66 See also Randolph v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 260 F.2d 461
(8th Cir. 1958).
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It has generally been held and quite properly, we think, that a
knowing and wilful refusal to verify an answer in order that the
insurance company may defend an action against him, constitutes
a failure to co-operate and a breach of the conditions in the
policy.
67
The insured, however, is under no obligation to combine with the in-
surer to present a sham defense. 6
While the refusal of the insured to assist in asserting a valid
defense will excuse the company from liability . . . yet, if his
co-operation is improperly demanded, as where he is asked to aid
-in asserting a sham defense, his failure to co-operate will not
release the company from its obligation under the policy.69
It has been held that a refusal to verify an answer under a mistaken
belief, honestly held and not for obstruction of the defense, would be
excused.70 It is the wilful refusal to verify a proper answer that will
bring aibout a breach 6f the condition and relieve the insurer.
FALSE OR CONFLICTING TESTIMQNY AT TRIAL
When the insured testifies at the trial, the insurer logically expects
testimony substantially consistent to what the insured bad previously
stated. If the testimony differs materially and is false, the cooperation
clause is breached. 71 New York, however, does not consider the truth:-
fulness or 'falseness of the testimony to be of importance. Rather it is
held that testimony which is materially variant from previous statements
is clear evidence of a breach.7 2 Under this, rule, conflicting testimony
and statements regarding who was driving,73 speed7 4 and position 5
of the automobiles has been held to relieve the insurer of liability.
This phase of the clause is often put to use, when the insured has
given testimony which is in sharp conflict to the facts as set out in the
verified answer which was drawn from the statements of the insured.
The insurer is entitled to rely upon the truthfulness of the allegations
and denials as set out in the verified answer and to assume they will
be supported by the insured's testimony. Of course, any variance be-
tween the testimony and statements of the insured must be material and
substantial and a slight variance will not suffice. 76 "It is only natural
6 7 Jenkinson v. New York Cas. Co., 241 Wis. 328, 331, 6 N.W.2d 192, 194 (1942).
68 Ibid.69 Finkle v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 224 Mo. App. 285, '291, 26 S.W.2d 843, 847
(1930).
70 Ibid.71 Medico v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 132 Me. 422, 172 A. 1 (1934) ; Buck-
ner v. Buckner, 207 Wis. 303, 241 N.W. 342 (1932).72 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Von Bargen, 7 App. Div. 872, 182
N.Y.S.2d 121 (1959) ; Buckner v. Buckner, 207 Wis. 303, 241 N.W. 342 (1932).73 Brogdon v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 290 Mich. 130, 287 N.W. 406 (1939);
Contra: Meyers v. Smith, 375 S.W.2d 9 (1964).74 Wright v. Farmers Auto. Inter-Insurance Exch., 39 Cal. App. 2d 70, 102 P.2d
352 (1940).75 Shafer v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 248 App. Div. 279, 289 N.Y.S. 577 (1936).
76 Caron v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 252 Minn. 247, 90 N.W2d 86 (1958).
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that there should be some overlooked details that amount to variances
between statements taken by the insurer and the insured's testimony.""7
Some jurisdictions require not only that the breach be material and
substantial but also require that it be due to a conscious and deliberate
intent to deceive.78 Still other jurisdictions do not hold material variances
at trial to be a breach of the clause if the trial testimony is true.7 9 This
appears to be explained under grounds of public policy to encourage
testimony at trials.
COLLUSION
One of the major purposes for inclusion of the cooperation clause
in the insurance contract is to protect the insurer against collusion be-
tween the insured and the injured third party. The insured can not,
by fraud or collusion, assist the claimant with the maintenance of his
suit 0 and is under a duty to refrain from any such conduct which may
operate to the prejudice of the insurer in the conduct of the defense or
settlement of the claim. It was held, however, that the insured's disclo-
sure of insurance coverage to the claimant was not a breach of the
cooperation requirements."' The active participation of the insured in a
garnishment suit, instituted by the claimant, after the initial suit had
ended in a judgment against the insurer, did not avoid coverage. S2 The
giving to plaintiff's attorney of the same statement that had previously
been given the insurer was not a breach" and even obtaining a release
from the plaintiff's attorney of that portion of damages which might be
awarded in excess of the policy limits did not constitute a breach of
the condition.8 4 As the above examples demonstrate, to establish collu-
sion more than a mere act is necessary. The act must be purposely in-
tended to aid the claimant and hinder the company and must correspond
to bad faith. In essence, the elements of a conspiracy must be present.
In State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Boracci, 5 the court stated
that the insurer would be relieved of liability if the insured "fraudulently
conspired" with the claimant to create the appearance of a valid cause
of action against him. Similar reasoning was demonstrated in Storer v.
Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. 6 where the court said:
Whether Strohl failed to cooperate was to be determined by
proper inferences to be drawn from the facts, and we think that
the decided weight of the evidence, considered in the aggregate,
is that he not only failed, but that he purposely intended through
7 Patterson v. Patterson, 178 F. Supp. 633, (D. Minn. 1959).
78 Kurz v. Collins, 6 Wis. 2d 538, 95 N.W.2d 365 (1959).79 Valladao v. Fireman's Fund, 13 Cal. 2d 322, 89 P.2d 643 (1939).
10 Buckner v. Buckner, 207 Wis. 303, 241 N.W. 342 (1932).
81 Porter v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 104 P.2d 1087 (Cal. App. 1940).
82 Bernadich v. Bernadich, 287 Mich. 137, 283 N.W. 5 (1938).
si Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Weimar, 96 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1938).
84 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chapman, 269 F.2d 478 (4th Cir. 1959).85 111 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1940).
8680 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1935).
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false testimony to aid appellant in recovering a judgment against
himself, eventually to be paid by appellee s7
A. Family Relationships
Considering the mobile nature of our society today, it is not surpris-
ing that the injured party would be a friend or relative of the insured,
at least if a guest in the automobile. The ordinary friendly relationship
between friends or members of a family group does not of itself furnish
evidence of fraud or collusion.88
In such a case where members of the family corruptly conspired
and worked together to secure a recovery not justified by the
facts, the policy should be and is avoided; but it is not avoided
merely because the sympathy of the insured is with the injured
members of his family rather than with the company which in-
sured him, or because he does not suspend during litigation or-
dinarily friendly intercourse with his family. The iniquity is not
whether the sympathy of the insured is with the plaintiff in the
litigation, but whether he has failed to furnish proper assistance
to the company in its defense of the suit or has entered into collu-
sion with the plaintiff to establish liability unfairly. When such
relationship exists, however, the conduct and testimony of the
parties should be carefully scrutinized by the court and jury since
the interest of the parties is not really adverse.8 9
When, however, the friendly relationship between the parties is coupled
with the elements of collusion, the insurer would not be liable under
the policy.
His friendly relationship with appellant, his private conferences
with her attorneys, both before and at the first trial, and his re-
peated admissions under oath that he had testified falsely upon
first trial, concerning the vital issue of the case, leave little room
for any other conclusion."0
B. Voluntary Submission to Service of Process
When the insured voluntarily and in collusion with the claimant
submits to service of process in a jurisdiction where he would not other-
wise be amenable to service, it is a breach of cooperation. It was so held
in Mayflower Cas. Ins. Co. v. Osborne91 where the insured permitted
service upon himself in another jurisdiction because the attorneys re-
tained by the insured for the injured parties, the insured's wife and
stepdaughter, believed they had a better chance to recover against him
in the other jurisdiction. However, if the insured enters the jurisdiction
innocently and without collusion or if substituted service could be had,
this would not be a lack of cooperation.9 2
87 Id. at 472.
88 Pearl Assur. Co. v. Watts, 69 N.J. Super. 198, 174 A.2d 90 (1960).
89 State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 105 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1939).
90 Storer v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 80 F.2d 470,472 (6th Cir. 1935).91326 Fl2d 461 (4th Cir. 1964).92 Marcum v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 59 S.E.2d 433 (W.Va. 1950).
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ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY
The clause specifically requires that the insured shall not voluntarily
assume any obligation. This problem usually arises immediately after
an accident when the insured makes a written statement to the effect
that he was at fault or admits liability. The court in Kindervater v.
Motorists Casualty Ins. Co.93 stated:
The insured's statement "I admit liability in the abovementioned
accident" relieved the insurer from liability. An interpretation that
would require a demonstration of substantial detriment to the
insurer, as a result of the breach of such a condition, would
seriously impair its practical efficacy.9 4
However, the clause does not prevent the insured from making a
truthful explanation to the claimant of the accident or of the circum-
stances regardless of its effect. 95 Some courts, interpreting the clause
somewhat differently, hold that there is a distinction between admitting
fault and assuming liability. These courts state that assumption of
liability means to contract an obligation.
It may be said that this is a distinction without a difference. We
do not think so. To assume liability is to contract an obligation,
whereas to admit fault is merely to admit the truth of a fact,
from which liability may flow. There is nothing abhorrent in an
insurer requiring that its assured shall not contract away the
right to defend threatened litigation and to prohibit the assured
from thus rendering certain the liability of the insurer. An insurer
has a right to defend an action and to attempt to prove that there
is no liability. This it cannot do if liability has already been as-
sumed by its assured. But there is something contrary to our
ideas as to what should be an established public policy for an
insurer to require from an insured that he, the assured, shall not
make a statenent about the facts of an accident in which he may
be involved. If it is contrary to public policy to prohibit the
making of a statement, then surely it is contrary to public policy
to require that, if a statement is made, it must be favorable under
penalty of loss of insurance protection. 6
It appears that a majority of jurisdictions do not permit the distinction
and look to the jury to decide the issue using the applicable material
breach or prejudice standard.
WAIVER OF BREACH BY INSURER
The insurer must, upon discovery of a breach of the cooperation
clause which it intends to rely upon in avoiding coverage, disclaim liabil-
ity promptly. Unless this is done, a waiver of the breach will be ef-
fected.97 The insurer may not thereafter assert the breach. However,
93 199 A. 606 (N.J.L. 1938).
94 Id. at 608.
95 Crook v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.2d 241
(1960).
96 U-Drive-It Car Co. v. Freidman, 153 So. 500, 502 (La. App. 1934).
97 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1958).
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the insurer could proceed to defend under a full reservation of rights.98
The insurer is also under a duty to know of the breach. In Norwich
Union -Indem. Co. v. Haas,9 9 the Illinois court -held that an insurer
waives its defense by continuing under a policy when it .knows or in
the course of ordinary events should have known the facts in question
and the insurer is bound to have known if in the exercise of ordinary
diligence it could have known. However, the continuation of a defense
for an insured who had disappeared was held in Durbin v. Lord'0 0
not to be a waiver where it had no definite knowledge of the reason.
DUTY OF INSURER
The cooperation clause specifically and impliedly places reciprocal
duties upon both parties of the insurance contract. 10 1 The insurer must
take all reasonable steps to assure the assistance and cooperation of the
insured. The problems in this area commonly arise when the insured
disappears.
The problem of non-cooperation has a dual aspect: not only what
the assured failed to do, but what the insurer on its part did to
secure cooperation from an apathetic, inattentive, or vanished
policy-holder, must be considered. Liability insurance is intended
not only to indemnify the assured, but also to protect members of
the public who may be injured through negligence. Indeed, such
insurance is made mandatory in many states. It would greatly
weaken the practical usefulness of policies designed to afford
public protection if it were enough to show mere disappearance
of the assured without full proof of proper efforts to locate him. 0 2
How much diligence must the insurer show?. The answer to this ques-
tion was given in two New.York cases, which involved an insured that
had disappeared, as follows :103
(1) Letters to all known addresses of the assured;
(2) Letters to all known members of his family;
(3) Inquiry at the Motor Vehicle Registry for licenses and regis-
tration information;
(4) Voting records;
(5) All employment sources for past and present employers to
see whereabouts and references;
(6) Running of a "skip trace" on the assured by a credit checking
agency;
(7) Application to all neighboring states' Motor Vehicle Registries
98 Travelers' Indem. Co. v. Holiman, 174 Miss. 220, 164 So. 36 (1935).
99 179 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1950).
100 329 Ill. App. 333, 68 N.E.2d 537 (1946).
101 Imperiali v. Pica, 338 Mais. 494, 156 N.E.2d 44 (1959).
102 Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Cas. Ins. Co. v. Owens, 238 F.2d 549,
550 (4th Cir. 1956).
103 Wallace v. Universal Ins. Co., 18 App. Div. 2d 121 (1963), affd, 13 N.Y.2d
978, 244 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1963) ; National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lococo, 20
App. Div. 2d 785 (1965), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 960, 259 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1965).
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to determine if the assured has obtained a license or registra-
tion in those states;
(8) Checking of missing persons records of local and state police
departments;
(9) Checking of the Department of Correction records to see
whether the assured is in jail;
(10) Letters to state and federal tax authorities, and to the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, to determine if they
have a more recent address;
(11) Newspaper advertisements in local papers for at least one
week;
(12) Checking on all other possible contacts, including union, politi-
cal, religious, etc.
This is an enormous burden to place on the insurer and it is not sug-
gested that this procedure be followed every time the insured has dis-
appeared. However, if the company intends to base its disclaimer of
coverage upon the disappearance, it would be well to follow the proce-
dure.
All situations will not create the necessity of such a burdensome pro-
cedure. In Barnes v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Ml/ut. Ins.
Co.,10 4 the insured felt liability was so certain there was no necessity
to appear. The court did not agree and stated that even in clear cases
of liability, the presence of the insured may tend to mitigate against
the amount of the verdict and the court held that this possibility made
the voluntary and unexcused absence from trial of the insured a sub-
stantial and material lack of cooperation and should suffice to show
prejudice in those jurisdictions where such a showing is required. In
cases of this type therefore, little additional effort was required of the
company. Each situation must therefore be evaluated on its facts and
an application of the "good faith" doctrine applied.
COMPULSORY LIABILITY INSURANCE AND FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY LAws
The advent of compulsory liability insurance and financial respon-
sibility laws have had a decided effect upon the potential defense of
lack of cooperation. Where the statutes creating compulsory insurance
or financial responsibility have as their stated purpose the protection of
the public, the insurer may not assert non-cooperation as a defense
when sued by a member of the class sought to be protected.10 5 The
language of the creating statute must be studied closely to determine
its effect. This was illustrated in a recent case.1 0 6 The court held that
the Arizona Financial Responsibility Law precluded the defense. The
creating statute read as follows:
104 146 So. 2d 119 (Fla. App. 1962).
05 LONG, LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 14.18 n.4 (1966).
106 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 372 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967).
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This policy may not be cancelled or annulled as to such liability
by an agreement between the insurance carrier and the insured
after the occurrence of the injury or damage, and no statement
made by the insured or on his behalf and no violation of the
policy shall defeat or void the policy.' 0 7 (emphasis added)
On the other hand the Illinois statute provides:
No such policy shall be cancelled or annulled as respects any
loss or damage by any agreement between the carrier and the
insured after said insured has become responsible for such loss
or damage and any such cancellation or annullment shall be
void.'10 (emphasis added)
Under the Arizona statote the insurer was precluded from raising the
defense. It is questionable if the same conclusion would be reached
under the Illinois statute as any breach would occur prior to any de-
termination of responsibility. However, some state financial responsibil-
ity laws permit the defense specifically.0 9 In compulsory liability insur-
ance jurisdictions the law of the state has no extraterritorial effect so
that an accident covered under a policy issued under the law which
happens outside of the state would be subject to the defense."10 All that
can be said here is to issue a note of caution to the attorney in jurisdic-
tions subject to these laws of the potential problems which may be
added to the case.
CONCLUSION
The cooperation clause, along with notice requirements, represent
the main areas of concern to the insurer when it evaluates its right to
disclaim coverage. The insured is equally concerned with the clause
when he faces a trial or judgment and expects to be provided with a
defense or coverage. While there are no clearly defined general rules
which apply, the basic duty of each party to the insurance contract can
be defined by the term "reasonable action." Each must do all that is
within his power to help the other within the terms of the contract. Each
factual situation has to be decided upon its own facts, but any reading
of the case law in which the cooperation clause is at issue leads to but
one conclusion-the imposition of a duty of good faith upon the parties
in their dealings with one another.
TiiOMAS A. ERDMANN
107 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1170(F) (1) (Supp. 1967).
308 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95Y, § 7-317(f) (2) (Smith-Hurd 1968).
109 Financial responsibility act of Ohio was discussed in in Gergely v. Pioneer
Mut. Cas. Co., 48 Ohio L. Abs. 376,74 N.E.2d 432 (1947).
310 Phillips v. Stone, 297 Mass. 341, 8 N.E.2d 890 (1937).
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